Suchergebnisse

Part I -- A theory of mobilization differences in identity types -- Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana -- Observable implications -- Part II -- Theory of political choice -- Ethnic and religious identity in Côte d'Ivoire's conflict -- Ethnicity and religion in Sudan's civil wars -- Ethnicity and religion in Nigeria's Biafran war -- Appendices

This book explains why conflicts in Africa are sometimes ethnic and sometimes religious, and why a conflict might change from ethnic to religious even as the opponents remain fixed. Conflicts in the region are often viewed as either 'tribal' or 'Muslim-Christian', seemingly rooted in deep-seated ethnic or religious hatreds. Yet, as this book explains, those labels emerge as a function of political mobilization. It argues that ethnicity and religion inspire distinct passions among individuals, and that political leaders exploit those passions to achieve their own strategic goals when the institutions of the state break down. To support this argument, the book relies on a novel experiment conducted in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana to demonstrate that individual preferences change in ethnic and religious contexts. It then uses case illustrations from Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and Sudan to highlight the strategic choices of leaders that ultimately shape the frames of conflict.

"Identity, Internal State Conflict, and Religion" published on by Oxford University Press.

"The Politics of Pentecostalism in Africa" published on by Oxford University Press.

This article explores how religious bias, once it has been cultivated through politicization and violence, can be reduced. Using foundations from social identity theory and superordinate goal theory, I develop post-conflict bias reduction strategies that include competing types of superordinate messages, economic and theological, as well as different sources of those messages. To test these strategies, I use video-based information treatments coupled with Implicit Association Tests in Bouake, Cote d'Ivoire. The experimental findings point to three conclusions. First, implicit Muslim-Christian bias in the study area remains high. Second, Christians in the study tend to be more biased against Muslims than Muslims are against Christians. Third, the effectiveness of treatments depends on the subjects who receive those treatments: theological messages are most effective in reducing bias among Muslims, regardless of their source, and strategies that rely on political leaders to deliver messages perform best among Christians, regardless of the content. Adapted from the source document.

When elites mobilize supporters according to different cleavages, or when individuals realign themselves along new identity lines, do their political preferences change? Scholars have focused predominantly on the size of potential coalitions that leaders construct, to the exclusion of other changes that might occur when one or another identity type is made salient. In this article, I argue that changes in the salience of ethnicity and religion in Africa are associated with variation in policy preferences at the individual level. I test this claim empirically using data from a framing experiment in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. By randomly assigning participants to either a religious or an ethno-linguistic context, I show that group members primed to ethnicity prioritize club goods, the access to which is a function of where they live. Otherwise identical individuals primed to religion prioritize behavioral policies and moral probity. These findings are explained by the geographic boundedness of ethnic groups and the geographic expansiveness of (world) religions in the study area.

Informal institutions continue to govern political exchange in Africa, but the traditional, ethnic-based form of "big man rule" is now threatened by an alternative informal institution — charismatic Pentecostalism. This study evaluates the status of Pentecostalism empirically, in a micro-level experiment in Ghana. Using data from a variant of the dictator game, in which participants divide a resource endowment with randomly assigned partners as well as cultural leaders, the study provides evidence of Pentecostal exclusivity, excessive allegiance to leaders, and a shift away from ethnic-based patronage to Pentecostal patronage. As Pentecostalism continues to expand, these findings suggest a modification in the exchange of resources for loyalty in Africa, and grounds for viewing the movement as a new form of big man rule in the region.

This article explores how religious bias, once it has been cultivated through politicization and violence, can be reduced. Using foundations from social identity theory and superordinate goal theory, I develop post‐conflict bias reduction strategies that include competing types of superordinate messages, economic and theological, as well as different sources of those messages. To test these strategies, I use video‐based information treatments coupled with Implicit Association Tests in Bouaké, Côte d'Ivoire. The experimental findings point to three conclusions. First, implicit Muslim‐Christian bias in the study area remains high. Second, Christians in the study tend to be more biased against Muslims than Muslims are against Christians. Third, the effectiveness of treatments depends on the subjects who receive those treatments: theological messages are most effective in reducing bias among Muslims, regardless of their source, and strategies that rely on political leaders to deliver messages perform best among Christians, regardless of the content.

This article explores the relationship between economic development strategies and conflict outcomes in Africa, using a comparison of Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana. Findings suggest that development strategies that create contestation for resources along identity group lines, absent provisions for co-opting disenfranchised groups, increase the likelihood of communal violence, whereas development plans that transcend ascriptive social identities bear the greatest chance of generating long-term peace, irrespective of their short-term economic success. The author complements the comparative case study with evidence of intracase variation in Ghana and with original micro-level data collected in 2009. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]